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abstract If we take a long-range view of competition regimes, we
can document in the 20th century a case of major transformation.
There has been a double evolution – away from cooperation and
cartelization and towards competition on the one hand, from
nationally bounded regimes to a globally interconnected regulatory
sphere on the other. The antitrust tradition that emerged in the USA
at the turn of the 20th century has gained significant and widespread
influence after 1945, imposing itself in many parts of the world. The
objective of this article is to retrace the process by which antitrust has
gone from being a local legal rule to a nearly global structuring frame.
We trace the fate of a local set of ideas turning into international
politics and globally accepted principles. We also show that those
global principles are subject to and interact with local politics –
through the process of diffusion but also in their implementation.
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local politics
55
Introduction
Competition regimes contribute significantly to the structuring of economic
activity and the shaping of economic behaviour (Djelic, 1998; Dobbin and
Dowd, 2000; Stearns and Allan, 1996). By ‘competition regime’, we mean the
normative and structural institutions that define, in any particular context,
the accepted and legal balance between competition and cooperation while
shaping the local understanding of competition.
If we take a long-range view of competition regimes, we can document in
the 20th century a case of major transformation. By the end of the Second
World War, competition regimes were predominantly set and structured
within national boundaries and only had national reach. By then and even
much later in some regions or countries, the balance tended to be in favour of
cooperation and cooperative arrangements. In most countries, competition
was viewed suspiciously as bringing along disruptions of both the economic
and social order, chaos and suboptimal allocation of resources (Djelic, 2002;
Magnusson, 1994). Cooperation and cooperative agreements – monitored
either by firms themselves, associations or even the State – were plebiscited as
leading to orderly economic development with minimal disruptive or
destructive effects. This preference for cooperation had translated at the
international level during the interwar period. Those were the heydays of
international cartels – linking together either several national firms or several
national cartels (Haley, 2001; Kudo and Hara, 1992).
In that context, the USA were highly exceptional. In 1890, that country had
declared cartels and all other forms of interfirm agreements illegal. The
antitrust tradition that developed locally from that point on came together
with the championing of competition and its benefits (Peritz, 1996). At the
level of discourse, the American antitrust tradition associated with a neo-
classical understanding of competition. In practice, however, American
antitrust ended up fostering an oligopolistic form of competition (Djelic,
2002). In about half a century, this exceptional – and in 1945 still highly
marginal – competition regime has gained significant influence, imposing
itself in many parts of the world. More than 90 countries have today a
competition regime that is inspired overall by the same basic principles. What
is more, we have witnessed an extension and expansion of the reach of this
particular type of competition regime into transnational arenas – towards
the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and African regional agreements.
The double evolution – away from cooperation and cartelization and
towards competition on the one hand, from nationally bounded regimes to a
globally interconnected regulatory sphere on the other – undeniably amounts
to a major transformation of economic rules of the game in many parts of the
world. The objective of this article is to retrace the process by which antitrust
has gone from being a local legal rule to becoming a nearly global structuring
frame, with a potentially significant impact on the homogenization of market
conditions. Hence, we are looking at the emergence of antitrust as a key
mechanism of the process of globalization.
The story we tell is a story in four stages. The first stage was the emergence
of antitrust in the USA at the end of the 19th century. A second stage was
the attempt to turn what was then a local idea into international politics.
American antitrust was exported, after 1945, to a few geographical nodes with
a fair degree, however, of parallel local resistance and translation. A third stage
was the rapid globalization of antitrust principles starting after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in the early 1990s. This stage was characterized by rapid spread
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and diffusion or contagion to many regions in the world. But global ideas and
principles are subject to local politics – through the process of diffusion
naturally but also in the ways in which they are being implemented. The
antitrust community has recognized that – acknowledging the remaining
heterogeneity when it comes to antitrust implementation and practice.
Hence, we have entered a fourth stage with the recent attempts at trying to
bring together, at the global level, those multiple local versions of the same
tradition. The International Competition Network (ICN) was created in the
fall of 2001 to articulate and homogenize further local antitrust efforts, in
both substance and practice.
A National Legislation Goes Abroad
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, the emergence of an antitrust
tradition was one more element of American exceptionalism. The American
take on issues of competition and interfirm collaboration was then unique and
peculiar. After 1945, the consequences of the war and a redefinition of the
geopolitical context led to the first attempts at exporting – and importing –
the American antitrust tradition, to Germany and Japan or to the European
coal and steel community for example.
AN ISLAND OF ANTITRUST IN A SEA OF INTERFIRM
COLLABORATION
In 1890, the US Congress voted in the Sherman Antitrust Act. Following the
Civil War and its many disruptions, cartels and other forms of loose agree-
ments had proliferated as a strategy to achieve market stabilization and
control. The intent behind the Sherman Act was initially to curb the threat
that those aggregates of economic power were perceived to represent and to
re-establish the conditions for free and fair competition. The unique set of
conditions, however, in which this Act was enacted limited its domain of
applicability and had unintended consequences of significance (Peritz, 1996).
Early court cases showed that cartels and other ‘restraints of trade or
commerce’ across the states of the Union would be prohibited per se. The
Sherman Act being a Federal legislation, however, it did not apply within
states. Tight combinations or mergers within the legal frame of particular
states that made them possible (such as New Jersey) seemed to lie outside its
reach (Roy, 1997). And corporate lawyers were soon identifying mergers as an
alternative to cartelization, legal under the Sherman Act (Sklar, 1988).
The passing of the Sherman Act was thus indirectly a triggering force in the
first American merger wave (1895–1904). In an irony of history, the fight for
competition in the USA led to the emergence of large, integrated firms and
contributed to the oligopolistic reorganization of American industries. The
Sherman Act was read as outlawing cartels and loose forms of agreements per
se. With respect to size, however, and hence mergers, the interpretation that
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ultimately came to dominate in the Supreme Court was that illegality
stemmed not from size per se but from ‘unreasonableness’ – as revealed by the
proven intent and purpose to exclude others and stifle competition. In 1914,
the Clayton Act confirmed and institutionalized this ‘rule of reason’ argument
for size and mergers (Peritz, 1996). By the 1920s, both the prohibition per se
of cartels and the ‘rule of reason’ with respect to mergers had become
trademarks and defining features of the American antitrust tradition. In the
USA, collusion and cooperation between independent firms became legally
and morally impossible. Instead, competition was valued – but in practice the
American antitrust tradition was fostering oligopolistic competition (Djelic,
2002).
In Europe also, the trend towards cartelization had started during the 1860s
and 1870s. It was triggered by economic, technological and political dis-
ruptions and evolutions. It revealed a search for order, stability and control
that lasted well beyond in fact disturbed and troubled years. Although the
trend was common, the nature of interfirm agreements varied across
countries and during the period. They could be more or less formal and
structured; they could be horizontal, vertical or even both. They could share
markets, agree on price levels, set production quotas, collaborate on R&D or
pool profits. They could be fragile temporary agreements or, as in Germany
and France during the 1940s, they could be state backed, compulsory and
legally enforceable. The strength and enduring character of the cartelization
movement in Europe set itself in an institutional context that was tolerant of
interfirm collaborations if not actively fostering them. In most European
countries, competition and price wars tended to be negatively valued as essen-
tially disruptive both to the economy and to social order. Agreements and
cartels, because they set limits to competition and its associated disruptions,
were identified as progressive steps away from chaos and towards orderly and
rational economic development (Michels, 1928).
Because at the time the share of Europe in the total value of exports of
manufactured goods was around 70%, this profound distrust of competition
reflected upon international business relations. The rule, there also, was
interfirm collaboration. By the 1920s and 1930s, international cartels had
become very powerful and they had significant reach – different estimates
show the share of international trade under cartel control at somewhere
between 40% and 50% during that period (Haley, 2001; Kudo and Hara,
1992: 2ff.). The motives behind international cartels, their functions but also
their degree of structure and formalization varied along the lines described
above for national cartels. Hence there was, before 1940, a system of inter-
national governance for business relations – but international collaboration
had then for objective to limit competition not to foster it. The seat of inter-
national cartelization was Europe but Japanese and American firms were also
involved – the latter in spite of domestic antitrust regulation (Kudo and Hara,
1992). In fact, American policy towards international cartels got into a strange
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twist during the 1920s. The Webb-Pomerene Act allowed, in 1918, American
producers in the same line of business to form joint companies to manage
their exports. In the mid-1920s, the Federal Trade Commission was express-
ing the view that the only test of legality for foreign cooperative agreements
was that these arrangements would have no effect upon domestic conditions
within the USA. American firms took that to be permission to engage in
cartels outside the USA and the practice became quite common during the
1920s and 1930s. The most famous – because they were soon infamous – such
involvements were those of General Electric in the Phoebus cartel, and those
of Dupont, Allied Chemicals or Standard Oil in cartels dominated by the
German firm IGFarben.
ENGINEERING A GERMAN REVOLUTION
Things changed radically after 1945 when the peculiar American tradition of
antitrust was revived and crossed national borders. An important destination
was Germany where the USA loomed large, both as model and architect, in
the process of local institutional reinvention. A widely shared conviction that
cartels had played an important role in the building up of Nazi strength led
Western Allied Forces to act rapidly. In February 1947, the American Military
Government imposed a decartelization and deconcentration law that set itself
within the long-standing American antitrust tradition. With respect to
restrictive practices, cartels, combines, syndicates or trusts, it was based on the
prohibition principle, outlawing them per se, but it said little about size
(Berghahn, 1986; Djelic, 1998).
In fact, the question of deconcentration and how far it should go generated
heated debates within the American administration, in Washington and in
occupied Germany (Djelic, 1998: 81ff.; Martin, 1950). The onset of the cold
war settled the issue. West Germany became an important outpost in the fight
against communism and as a consequence the deconcentration programme
lost in significance. American authorities instead came to advocate an oligop-
olistic structure for the German industry. The model was American and the
idea was that ‘oligopolies, when policed by the vigorous enforcement of
antitrust and anticartel laws as in the United States, yield pretty good results’
(Office of Military Government for Germany, United States [OMGUS],
Bd18).
American policy makers were quite aware that radical transformations of
the sort they were fostering would only outlast the period of acute geopolitical
dependence if Germans appropriated them. Hence, in the treaty allowing
Germany to progressively regain sovereignty, the American government
demanded that German agencies prepare their own competition law. This
law, it was agreed, once accepted by German and Allied authorities, would
replace the 1947 legislation. This did not prove an easy task, however, and
the business communities, in particular, resisted violently the grafting in
Germany of the American antitrust tradition (Braunthal, 1965). It took 10
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years, a protracted fight and strong American pressure all along for Germans
to agree on a bill. The Federal Law against Restrictions of Competition was
finally enacted in July 1957.
On the whole, this law was congruent with American antitrust tradition.
Cartels and loose agreements were identified as unreasonable combinations in
restraint of trade and outlawed per se. However, the German legislator
provided for a number of exceptions. The Cartel Office (Bundeskartelamt) was
granted a certain amount of leeway through enforcement of the law and
monitoring of exceptions. Antitrust had been transferred to Germany, but it
had been partially translated and adapted in the process in response to heated
local politics (Quack and Djelic, 2005).
SEEDING ANTITRUST IN THE EUROPEAN SPACE
While the USA were encouraging or imposing bilateral transfers of their
antitrust tradition, they were also pressing for initiatives with a cross-national
dimension. In Western Europe, France led the way with the proposal, in May
1950, to pool European coal and steel industries. Jean Monnet and the French
Planning Council insisted that the goal was to create a competitive space to
stimulate production and productivity (Monnet, 1976). They wanted to
alleviate American fears that this project might lead to the emergence of a
European wide cartel and hence they brought in American experts to prepare
antitrust provisions. The key figure was Robert Bowie, Harvard antitrust
lawyer and General Counsel to John McCloy, the US High Commissioner in
Germany. Bowie was already involved in the drafting of a German antitrust
law when he came to Paris in June 1950 – ‘on loan’ from McCloy to his friend
Monnet. In Paris, he wrote the provisions that would become articles 65 and
66 of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty (Monnet,
1976).
As in Germany, resistance proved strong, notably among French, Belgian
and German business communities. But the final ECSC treaty endorsed
anticartel and antitrust objectives and articles 65 and 66 were incorporated as
a major dimension of that treaty. Article 65 dealt with cartels and loose
agreements, prohibiting them in principle. However, the European enforce-
ment agency, the High Authority, was granted some leeway to authorize, in
times of crisis, a number of exceptions. In particular, it could allow national
States to grant aid to individual undertakings or industries or even to accept
certain types of agreements. Article 66 of the ECSC treaty dealt with abuses
of market power through concentration. In line with American antitrust
tradition, only ‘unreasonable’ concentration was prohibited. Mergers that
could be shown to increase efficiency and productivity without representing a
threat to competition could be authorized.
Those two articles gained particular historical significance when they were
transferred in 1957 to the Rome Treaty. As it turned out, the coal and steel
community prepared the way for a wider common market and the European
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Economic Community, formalized in 1957, integrated the coal and steel pool
and appropriated its institutions. In fact, the Treaty of Rome extended to most
sectors of Western European economies those principles initially defined for
coal and steel by the ECSC treaty. Articles 65 and 66 of that early treaty
became articles 85 and 86 in the Rome treaty. In the words of Jean Monnet,
those articles, ‘drafted with great care by Robert Bowie, represented a
fundamental innovation in Europe’. According to him, ‘the essential antitrust
[sic] legislation reigning over the common market today ha[d] its origins in
those few sentences for which [he did] not regret to have fought during four
months’ (Monnet, 1976). Here again, however, the transfer of an American
antitrust tradition had come with a degree of translation and adaptation,
reflecting regional if not local politics and pressures.
From a Handful to an Epidemic: Global Spread of Antitrust
Principles
Between that period of dense activity and the late 1980s, nothing of great
significance happened with respect to internationalization of antitrust. Then,
in about 10 years, antitrust spread to more than 90 countries. By the end of
the 20th century, antitrust principles had de facto become structuring frames
on a global scale. But global principles interacted with local politics – leading
to decoupling and resilient heterogeneity across jurisdictions. Hence, efforts
to connect and bridge national regimes appeared necessary, with a view to
pushing homogenization in the process.
SPREADING ANTITRUST AT FAST SPEED
Three interconnected developments contribute to explain the antitrust ‘epi-
demic’ during the last 15 years of the 20th century. First, the Europeanization
project picked up after a lull – boosting activity around antitrust at the
community level. Then, in turn, such activism at the European level trickled
down towards member states. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the oldest
member states of the European community were busy institutionalizing,
stabilizing, modernizing or expanding their antitrust regimes – antitrust came
back to France for example in 1986. More recent members or candidate
countries in the late 1980s were starting from scratch and structuring their
own national antitrust regimes (Jenny, 2002).
A second development was the extension of the ‘West’ following upon the
fall of the Berlin Wall. With respect to antitrust, this triggered a wave of
international missionary activity unprecedented since the 1950s and in fact on
a much greater scale and scope. Both American and European antitrust
authorities were actively involved in the process of ‘exporting the rules of
competition regulation’ to Eastern and Central Europe but soon also to many
other countries (Murris, 2002; Pittman, 1998; Rouam, et al., 1994). In 1990,
American antitrust authorities sent altogether six international technical
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assistance missions. The equivalent figure for the period 1990–8 was 390,
showing a remarkable increase. Technical assistance meant, in that context,
helping ‘new’ countries write down antitrust laws and structure associated
institutions but also providing them with resources to help implementation
and monitoring.
In part as a consequence of such activity, competition laws were enacted
rapidly in many countries. Diffusion undeniably meant a globalization of
antitrust principles. At the same time, diffusion came through the prism of
local politics and many countries translated and adapted antitrust principles
to local contexts and constraints. Thus even though most competition
regimes in the world today can be traced back to the American antitrust
tradition, the multiplication of antitrust regimes first in Europe and then in
other regions of the world, including developing countries, has not resulted
in pure and simple convergence and homogeneity of rules and institutions.
This variability and heterogeneity has become an issue in recent years and has
led, as we show below, to a number of initiatives.
A third development, finally, was the process of economic international-
ization that gained momentum in the 1990s. This process created new
constraints, challenges and opportunities for antitrust, stimulating further its
tendency to cross national borders. When firms expand internationally, they
may take advantage of that to circumvent the legal and institutional con-
straints existing in their countries of origin. This could only further stimulate
the ‘old’ antitrust authorities to spread as wide as possible antitrust principles
and associated understandings of competition and free trade (Klein, 2000;
Melamed, 2000). But even this is not enough. When economic transactions
and interactions become transnational, they are likely to fall under the
scrutiny of multiple national or regional jurisdictions. Homogenizing and
globalizing legal principles and codified rules is an important but far from
sufficient step towards reducing the risk of conflicts. Rules can be read,
interpreted or implemented differently, depending upon the context in which
interpretation and implementation take place – depending upon local politics.
Hence, the globalization of economic activity was soon making it necessary to
think of coordination between multiple national antitrust authorities as well
as of further convergence not only with respect to legal principles and formal
rules but also with respect to understandings and practices.
GLOBAL PRINCIPLES AND LOCAL POLITICS:  DEALING WITH THE
CHALLENGE
A first strategy to emerge was the multiplication of bilateral agreements. The
USA and the EU were pioneers and signed the first such agreement initially
in 1991, renewing it in 1998. The agreement provides that one party alert the
other when a case affects its interests. Cooperation has been uneven but it
could imply a synchronization of investigations, the sharing of information,
and collaboration during the enforcement phase. The USA and the EU went
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on to sign other bilateral agreements with Canada, Australia, Japan or New
Zealand. By the end of the 1990s, there were bilateral agreements linking
together all the most developed antitrust authorities in the world. The
movement also extended to developing or transition countries. In particular,
the EU signed bilateral agreements with Eastern and Central European
countries as well as with other associated countries such as Morocco or
Tunisia (Rouam et al., 1994).
On the whole, bilateral agreements have played an important role.
However, they have inherent limitations. As an increasing number of antitrust
specialists were arguing by the end of the 1990s, when antitrust goes global
and concerns more than 90 countries, one cannot envision bilateral
agreements linking together all those countries (Klein, 2000). Furthermore,
beyond the obvious desire to cooperate they reveal, those agreements did not
prevent dissonance or even conflicts as illustrated by the major transnational
dispute around the General Electric (GE)/Honeywell case. Cooperation and
bilateral agreements were not enough, undeniably, to counter local politics
and to ensure convergence – beyond principles – of interpretations and
implementation.
For that, one would need to turn to multilateral schemes or agreements and
several paths were explored. An early initiative was set within the Organis-
ation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) context. The
OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee (CLP) had become a forum
for member countries to discuss competition policy issues. As early as 1967,
the OECD published a ‘Recommendation of the Council Concerning
Cooperation between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices
Affecting International Trade’. The CLP revised this recommendation in
1986 and then again in 1995. The OECD guidelines remained, however,
fairly restricted in scope and were nothing more than mere recommendations
with no implementation ‘muscle’. In 1998, the CLP proposed a recommen-
dation on the ‘Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels’. The level of
agreement reached in that context on the very harmful effects of some
anticompetitive practices was extremely high. Here again, though, agreement
did not lead on the ground to greater convergence in terms of formal rules,
processes and practices.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
was another forum where the multilateral path was tested. In 1980,
UNCTAD published a ‘Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices’ (UNCTAD-RBP-
Code). Following that, UNCTAD significantly built up its technical assis-
tance activity with the objective of helping developing countries level off with
the developed world on antitrust institutionalization and enforcement. But
here again the Code of Conduct of UNCTAD remained very much a set of
recommendations or guidelines with no direct or binding hold on nations or
local antitrust authorities.
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Starting in 1996, a third initiative was driven by the EU within the WTO –
and seconded there by Canada and Japan. This initiative set itself at the other
side of the spectrum. The idea was to ‘negotiate a binding’ multilateral
antitrust regime (Melamed, 2000). The EU identified the WTO as the
institution best suited to house such a framework both due to its ‘very broad
membership’ and to its ‘tradition of enforcing binding rules’ (Pons, 2002: 4).
The strategy was to interweave tightly the multilateral antitrust agenda with
trade negotiations. In June 1999, the EU Competition Commissioner, Sir
Leon Brittan, was proposing that:
in negotiating a WTO agreement, we should aim for gradual convergence of
approaches to anti-competitive practices that have a significant impact on
international trade. Our objective should not be to harmonize completely national
substantive rules but to identify core principles on which agreement can be
reached. (Brittan, 1999)
This European initiative was received quite reluctantly. Developing countries
were sceptical that adoption of a multilateral framework could be in their
interest. The strongest opponents, though, were the USA who argued against
a binding frame. The claim was that where countries might be ready to
cooperate in meaningful ways, they might not want to be legally bound under
international law.
On this basis, the USA had been pushing its own initiative since 1997. The
Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice created that year the
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC). ICPAC was
asked to consider three main issues – multijurisdictional merger review, future
directions in enforcement cooperation between US antitrust authorities and
their counterparts around the world particularly with respect to anticartel
prosecution efforts and the interface of trade and competition issues. ICPAC
worked for two years, producing a report that recommended against the
development of multilateral binding rules while suggesting ways of reaching
non-binding agreements. The ICPAC report proposed a Global Competition
Initiative to foster dialogue among antitrust officials but also between
antitrust officials and broader communities with a view to bringing about
common understandings and a common culture, greater convergence of laws,
analyses and eventually practices. American antitrust authorities appropriated
the conclusions of ICPAC and this proposal for a Global Competition
Initiative became the blueprint for the International Competition Network
that was set up in the fall of 2001.
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The International Competition Network: Global Politics of
Acculturation
The International Competition Network was officially launched in October
2001 during the Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and
Policy at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute in New York. The founding
members were 13 national antitrust agencies – Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the UK, the USA
and Zambia – and the European competition agency. Membership was open
from the beginning to all national, regional or multinational antitrust
agencies and in fact the numbers rose fast. By the spring of 2002, there were
already 50 members. One year later, the ICN had 77 members (Finckenstein,
2003). Given that there are around 90 competition authorities in the world,
the ICN is getting close to a global reach. Furthermore, its members
represent altogether close to 90% of world GDP.
THE ICN: A VIRTUAL NETWORK
The focus of the ICN is competition – ‘all competition all the time’
(Finckenstein, 2003). This overall focus is declined in four main missions.
First, the ICN aims at seeking substantive and procedural convergence
among competition jurisdictions on as wide a basis as possible. Second, the
ICN should facilitate international cooperation on competition issues and be
an important forum for contacts between developed and developing
countries. Third, the ICN hopes in time to be able to establish non-binding
‘best practices’ on competition matters. Fourth, the ICN also strives to play
an important role in advocating market and competition values around the
world – within competition agencies naturally but also beyond their walls,
within governments, business communities or civil societies (Ugarte, 2002;
http:// www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org ).
The ICN is structured as a network and it has three main characteristics. It
is inclusive, virtual and open. First, the ICN is inclusive because it encourages
as wide a membership as possible. All competition authorities are welcome to
join on a voluntary basis without having to fit any particular criteria.
Second, the ICN is a virtual network – with no offices, legal status,
employees or even budget. Members pay for themselves and cover the costs
of their own involvement with ICN, such as for example participation in the
yearly conference or the costs associated with the running of projects in
working groups. ICN does not have a central geographical hub or a perma-
nent Secretariat. A steering group sets agendas and work plans, identifying
priorities that then have to be approved by ICN members during the yearly
conference. The country chairing the steering group takes on for a year, on a
rotating basis, secretarial tasks and bears the costs associated with them. The
work itself is being done within ad hoc and temporary working groups that
focus on particular issues, meet rarely but use all forms of modern technology
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instead. Initially, three main working groups had been set up. The Merger
Review working group was run by American competition authorities and its
mandate was to ‘address the challenges of merger review in a multi-
jurisdictional context’ (http:// www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org).
The Advocacy working group was coordinated by Mexico and its objective
was to develop recommendations on the means to champion and advocate
antitrust and competition – ‘spread the gospel’ – particularly in developing or
transition countries where competition regimes are quite recent. A third
important working group was the Capacity Building and Competition Policy
Implementation working group, co-chaired by the EU and South Africa. The
objective of this working group was to rationalize and systematize technical
assistance to help developing and transition countries stabilize, entrench and
implement their new competition regimes.
Members of the steering group are representatives from those countries
‘that are committed to going forward with the mission of the ICN’ (http://
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org). This means, concretely, that
until now representatives from the more established antitrust agencies have
been dominant – and the USA has in particular played a key role. The first
annual conference took place in Naples, in September 2002 and the list of
participants tells us something about this unofficial but nevertheless real
power imbalance. Most of the 56 competition jurisdictions present sent in 1
or 2 – at most 3 – representatives. However, Canada sent in 5 representatives,
France sent 4, the European DGIV sent in 9 representatives and the USA sent
11 (http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org). Within the ICN,
some members are becoming increasingly vocal about this power imbalance
and the Chairman of the Italian Competition Authority, Giuseppe Tesauro,
who organized the Naples Conference, brought up the issue in his opening
speech:
So far it was indeed necessary for the Steering Committee to act rapidly and with
no frills. Now, I personally consider that it may be useful to ponder on some
modification and improvement concerning the number of members of the Steering
Committee, its composition and its working methods in order to achieve a better
balance between the biggest and the smallest economic and political entities. It
must be clear that all members of the competition family are the actors of the
initiative and that they all play an equal role. (Tesauro, 2002)
The ICN, finally, describes itself as an open network. Only organizations can
be members – and at that only competition agencies, either national or
regional. Nevertheless, it keeps a number of doors open to various con-
stituencies. It is different in that from a ‘club’ – although the latter imagery is
sometimes used in documents and speeches. In principle, the ICN wants to
‘maximize cooperation with non-governmental antitrust experts from the
relevant international, industry, consumer, legal, economic and academic
communities’ (Ugarte, 2002). As a transnational regulatory space, the ICN
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indeed attempts to co-opt experts from what could have been competing
regulatory bodies – the OECD, UNCTAD or the WTO. The ICN – or more
exactly its steering committee – is also highly aware of the need to build
bridges with neighbouring and wider constituencies to legitimize and stabilize
the type of competition regime they are championing. The way openness
concretely works is that each member agency can invite one non-govern-
mental expert to the annual conference. Working group members can also call
upon some of those experts to help them in their tasks.
The list of non-governmental advisors that were invited to the conference
in Naples is telling. Altogether, 48 such experts came to Naples. Five were
from international fora – OECD, UNCTAD, WTO and the World Bank.
Only two could be associated with the ‘consumer’ constituency although this
constituency is always among the first to be mentioned by members of the
ICN steering committee (Ugarte, 2002; http:// www.internationalcompetition
network.org). There were three representatives of the industry constituency
and nine from the academic community. All the rest were private lawyers and
more particularly partners from large Anglo-Saxon law firms. It might be too
early to draw conclusions from the way in which openness seems to be playing
out here. However, the strong presence of large Anglo-Saxon law firms is
certainly not without consequences for the way in which the ICN will evolve
and function.
INTENT ON SPREADING A ‘CULTURE’
The ICN does not have any ambition to exercise rule-making functions. It
was set up, in fact, as an alternative to the European initiative within the
WTO that called for strict and binding rules. Instead, the ICN sets itself
within a ‘soft law’ approach and aims at generating recommendations and
guidelines (Mörth, forthcoming). From the perspective of the ICN Steering
Committee, these recommendations or guidelines are ‘neutral’ – in the
double sense that they will not be imposed but collectively agreed upon by
most competition authorities in the world and that they should reflect ‘best
practices’. Leading members of the ICN Steering Committee are protesting
that ‘of course, consistently sound antitrust enforcement policy cannot be
defined and decreed for others by the US and Canada – not that you would
presume to do such a thing’ (Kolasky, 2002: 3). Naturally, the imbalance of
power in the structure and functioning of the ICN makes this ‘neutrality’ a
discourse more than a reality. Power relations are very much at work but they
play out in the guise of hegemonic processes (Foucault, 1994) that are more
subtle and more complex to identify and counter.
Whether recommendations are perceived to be scientific and neutral or, in
contrast, the products of hegemony, the logic at work remains the same. The
idea is to foster, as much as possible, consensus among and across competition
authorities. This can be achieved by creating a forum for dialogue and collec-
tive work – that is also a social space providing opportunities for various kinds
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of peer interactions if not peer pressure. The objective is to create, deepen and
spread worldwide the ‘culture’ of antitrust and competition – which as key
actors recognize is part of a ‘broader mosaic’ and comes together with a
culture of ‘markets’ (Kolasky, 2002: 3–5).
Beyond an international ‘club’, the ICN strives to become and express
what members of the Steering Committee call a ‘community of interest’
(Finckenstein, 2002). The idea is to create an inclusive and tight network of
insiders and to combine and articulate it with a number of weaker external
networks reaching out to important constituencies within society. Such a
combination should increase the scale and scope of the double effort at cul-
ture building and culture spreading. That one of the three original working
groups focused on ‘advocacy’ says enough about the centrality of that double
project of ‘culture building’ and ‘culture spreading’. The Advocacy working
group gave the following definition of competition advocacy:
Competition advocacy refers to those activities conducted by the competition
authority related to the promotion of a competitive environment for economic
activities by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its
relationships with other governmental entities and by increasing public awareness
of the benefits of competition. (Advocacy Working Group [AWG], 2002)
The AWG started from a systematic comparison of the situation of member
agencies and of their unique national conditions of institutional embed-
dedness. You do not face the same type of challenges, undeniably, when
championing antitrust and competition in the USA, Sweden or Serbia-
Montenegro. The AWG sent a questionnaire to each ICN member to build
the empirical basis for such comparison. It presented a first report during the
Naples Conference, underscoring differing perceptions of the importance of
advocacy in each member agency and relating that to a variation in the types
of obstacles and challenges that member agencies face in their competition
advocacy activities. The ultimate objective of the AWG will be to ‘recom-
mend best practices to ICN members and to provide them with information
to support their advocacy tasks’ with a consideration for the variability of
national institutional conditions and local politics (AWG, 2002).
TRICKLE-DOWN AND TRICKLE-UP TRAJECTORIES
The ICN does not work on the basis of a logic of constraint or coercion.
Members of the Steering Committee are nevertheless explicitly setting
themselves a goal: to have an impact on national member countries and their
competition regimes and more precisely to drive progressive but real con-
vergence of formal rules but also practices and understandings. We argue that
they are hoping to have such an impact in essentially two ways – through what
we have called elsewhere trickle-down and trickle-up trajectories (Djelic and
Quack, 2003).
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First, the ICN should have an impact through what can be called a trickle-
down trajectory. Members of the Steering Committee are hoping that ICN
work will come to reflect upon national competition regimes in a direct way,
through the involvement of representatives from member agencies. The idea
is not that members comply with recommended practices right from the
outset. Rather, the hope is that they will ‘consider them as aspirational goals
in the context of evolving national competition frameworks’ (Finckenstein,
2003: 13). Members are, in other words, under no obligation to ensure that
domestic laws reflect ICN guidelines and recommendations. Each agency will
decide whether and how to implement the recommendations – adapting its
strategies to local politics and constraints. However, members of the ICN
Steering Committee are expecting, on a practical level, ‘that as best practice
proposals are acted upon by members, a natural peer influence will come to
bear on other jurisdictions to do the same’ (Finckenstein, 2002: 4).
The type of influence that is hoped for by the ICN Steering Committee in
that context is quite parallel to mechanisms of diffusion associated with and
attributed to ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1989). At the same time, the
sequence of steps is somewhat different. The ICN is not contributing to the
building up of an epistemic community that will then in time ‘insinuate itself
into the policy making process’ of national members, potentially changing it
and its supporting institutions quite significantly in the process (Adler and
Haas, 1992). Rather, the ICN is hoping to bring closer together an already
existing but loosely coupled ‘epistemic community’ or ‘community of
interest’. That epistemic community already controls some key institutions
nationally and is involved in the policy making process – at least nominally.
The ICN aims at closing the ranks of that community both by deepening its
common culture and helping to strengthen its local position. This should
translate in time into greater convergence and homogenization of practices
and policy application.
The ICN Steering Committee hopes that such trickle-down trajectory will
combine with a trickle-up one. By opening the network of insiders to repre-
sentatives of relevant and important constituencies, the Steering Committee
hopes to build bridges towards those constituencies. Non-governmental
advisors are co-opted and involved in the work of the ICN at many different
stages with the idea that they will then become important agents of the fight
for competition and antitrust in their respective constituencies. Once a
number of local constituencies – or parts thereof – become champions of
competition and antitrust, they can push those ideas back up at the govern-
mental level and thus reinforce the impact and influence of competition
authorities.
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Discussion and Conclusion
The story of antitrust, as told here, is an interesting case and illustration of
globalization in the making – globalization as a process. What we document
is a step-by-step transformation of important rules of the economic game. A
set of local ideas became a tool for international politics and in the process
were transformed into globally dominant principles. Those global ideas
undeniably have mattered and still do. Their diffusion, however, and the ways
in which they have been implemented and turned into practice was very much
shaped, as we show, by local politics. Globalization, we propose, is precisely
about this interplay and feedback loop – the transformation of local ideas into
global principles and the reading of those principles through the prism of
local politics.
BETWEEN THE YEAH AND NAY SAYERS
The image of a ‘runaway world’ (Giddens, 2000) – a very fast train without
drivers going along the tracks of market and technological evolutions – will
probably remain associated with the 1990s and the associated phenomenon of
globalization. During that decade, this image triggered essentially three kinds
of reactions.
First were the believers – those who observed, predicted and championed
an acceleration of globalization, understood as unavoidable, ahistorical,
neutral and progressive force. Global ideas were bound to triumph because
they reflected an unavoidable structural evolution. Then came the sceptics for
whom the nation-state remained a robust structuring principle. Without
denying processes of internationalization, sceptics pointed to the depth of
local institutional roots and to the resilience of local politics. This resilience
expressed itself through significant hybridization of global ideas or else
through a decoupling between those ideas and local practice. Finally, one
found the critics – those who agreed that globalization was a reality in the
making but did not see it as progressive. Critics pointed to the negative
externalities associated with globalization – inequalities, unsustainable
growth, ecological disasters or the destruction of cultural and social diversity.
Naturally those three groups had quite different ideas on how to deal with
this ‘runaway world’. For believers, forces such as market competition,
technological change and rationalization were bringing along wealth, devel-
opment and social if not moral progress. Those forces hence should be set free
and liberated. Political and regulatory intervention created particularly
problematic hurdles and obstacles from that perspective. For sceptics this was
naive wishful thinking. From the sceptics’ perspective, the nation-state
remained extremely robust as a locus of structuration of social and economic
life. This vouched for the persistence of differences, made convergence
unlikely and in itself this strength of the polity at the national level set limits
and constraints to the process of globalization. As for critics, they identified
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the withering away of the polity, particularly in its national dimension, as
indeed a process associated with globalization. They saw it as one of the
negative externalities of a globalizing world, an externality that should be
countered. The argument went that, if left to its own devices, globalization
could have destructive consequences – particularly on the weak, the marginal,
the minorities, the diverse and the different. The polity could play in that
context the role of a buffer and filter and each state should act as a counter
power on its own territory.
Another and complementary side of the call for governance if not polity has
had to do with the space in between – the international arena. Generally, that
space has been viewed and described as anomic and apolitical, a space of non-
law largely unregulated and leaving free play to market, financial and
economic logics. Pleas for curbing the power and strength of those logics in
that arena have become not only more widespread but also more mainstream
at the turn of our millennium.
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON GLOBALIZATION
The story of antitrust illustrates, we propose, a different perspective on
globalization – a perspective that was outlined in different places before
(Djelic, 1998; Djelic and Quack, 2003). The contemporary episode of global-
ization can be seen as the articulation of a double process of institution
building in the transnational space and institutional change at the national
level. Globalization, we argue, is in fact deeply about governance – it is about
a transformation of governance systems or rules of the game in many nation-
states. It is also about the building, structuration and stabilization of new
governance systems in the transnational space. Transnational institution
building reflects the transformation of local ideas into global principles.
Those global principles in turn interplay with local politics, with a double
consequence. On the one hand, local politics translate and transform global
principles. On the other hand, those local politics and the peculiar institu-
tional context in which they are set are progressively reshaped and reinvented
through the interplay.
The case of antitrust is an illustration that something we can call
‘globalization’ is indeed happening. But it also shows that this globalization is
very much a process in the making, partly open ended, quite complex
and messy. Globalization is not, far from it, a state of things or a reality.
Globalization is not ‘the end of history’ – rather it is our history in the making.
National systems, structures and actors are feeling the pressure. They have to
react, adapt, adjust to rules of the game with a foreign or transnational origin.
At the same time, those rules of the game are themselves in the making and
national systems, actors and politics are closely involved, enmeshed and
entwined in the process of transnational rule making or institution building.
Hence the perspective on globalization that emerges questions the wide-
spread idea that globalization is an unavoidable, external force that simply
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imposes itself. The story of antitrust, and other stories told elsewhere (Djelic,
1998; Djelic and Quack, 2003), show that a lot more is at play than pure
market and technological determinism. The process of globalization illus-
trated here – globalization in the making – is a highly social and political
process. A multiplicity of actors are involved in shaping and spreading new
rules of the game – and those rules progressively turn into constraining frames
including for those actors themselves. In that respect, national states, systems
and actors are not merely receiving and passively reacting to external diktats.
Some of them, at least, are actively involved in shaping and spreading
structural and cognitive frames with an impact on economic behaviours and
interactions. Local politics play a significant role in the shaping of global
ideas.
The story of antitrust points to the need here to differentiate between at
least three different categories of countries. The first category is a peculiar
one in that it is a one unit sample. In the story of antitrust – and we have
argued elsewhere more generally in the story of the contemporary episode of
globalization since 1945 (Djelic, 1998; Djelic and Quack, 2003) – the USA
plays a unique role. The place of that country in the process of transnational
rule building has no equivalent. The USA is both a key purveyor of ‘models’
– local American rule systems are being ‘exported’ and ‘transnationalized’ –
and actively guiding and structuring the process of construction and
stabilization of transnational rules in a more or less visible and direct manner.
A second category is made up of a few core and rather rich countries
(European countries in particular) that are proactive and quite involved in
trying to shape that process while not having the same clout and presence as
the USA particularly when it comes to the provision of models. The third
category of countries, finally, is the larger one in terms of numbers. It brings
together those countries that altogether do have a more passive connection to
the process of transnational rule building associated with globalization.
Within those countries, the process of globalization might often be perceived
indeed as an external force, an inescapable logic imposing itself – which does
not necessarily mean that this force is having a real impact on local structures,
politics and patterns of action. The idea of decoupling is an interesting one
here – where the gap could be quite wide between formal institutions and
discourses on the one hand and the world of practice on the other.
Globalization, in the way we understand it here, is therefore not (nec-
essarily) about efficiency and the transfer of best practices. Efficiency or
effectiveness may or may not be an outcome – this we propose is an empirical
question to be tested a posteriori and we would rather remain agnostic on that
in this article. The functionalist account, however, that superior economic
and technological efficiencies are the main motor of the globalization process
does not make sense in light of what we show with the antitrust case. The
globalization process, it appears, is highly social and political. It has been and
still is about power and interests, networks of actors and flows of influences.
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The antitrust case shows also that power and influence may exert themselves
in different ways at different historical moments. In the early period, power
and influence were on the whole quite raw – reflecting a particularly unbal-
anced geopolitical equilibrium and often translating into direct coercion
mechanisms. Later on, and progressively, power and influence have become
neutralized – hidden behind a discourse on scientization, efficiencies and best
practices. The USA is not anymore ‘exporting’ a local model. Rather, they
claim mastery and ‘scientific leadership’ over a ‘universal’ and ‘natural’
trajectory.
To some degree, globalization thus means Americanization (Djelic, 2002)
but we propose the idea of ‘soft Americanization’ to underscore the complex,
partly open-ended and negotiated nature of the process. Throughout the
period we have dealt with in this article, patterns of and trends towards
convergence have for the most part been brought about by the clear
predominance of American structural, institutional and normative rules of the
game. This predominance reflected a situation of de facto unbalance in
geopolitical and geoeconomic power in the post-war period. This dominant
model, however, has not spread around in the same way everywhere and with
the same impact, as we have shown in the case described in this article. The
varied nature of diffusion mechanisms, differences in the institutional
grounds of reception, the nature and strength of local politics, the timing of
the process in any particular case, all played a role in ‘softening’ diffusion and
placing strong limits on ‘convergence’. The story we tell is a story where a
local, American, model has progressively been exported and transnationalized
through time. While this was undeniably happening, the double process of
exportation and transnationalization was, at all stages, a contested and nego-
tiated one. And the original model was evolving in the meantime, being
filtered, translated and partly reconstructed and renegotiated through and by
local politics. Globalization as we understand it is a world beyond conver-
gence and divergence, reflecting as it does a subtle mix of converging trends
and multiple local reading and fighting fields for those trends.
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